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Processes for remediation (removal of pollution or contaminants) of contaminated 
sediments have become very efficient. These technologies, which are particularly 
complex, call for a comprehensive approach to risk analysis which characterises all 
threats (to humans, equipment, local residents, the environment etc.). The STAMP 
accident model (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is an example of 
such a comprehensive approach, and it has been chosen to characterise the risks 
associated with Novosol®, an innovative remediation process. Risk analysis is carried 
out through the application of STPA (STamP-based Analysis). 
This article is organised into three sections. The first describes the Novosol® process 
for treating contaminated sediments. The second introduces the STAMP accident 
model, together with the associated technique STPA (which can be used both to 
evaluate safety and to perform accident analysis). Finally, the third section describes the 
concrete application of the STPA technique to the Novosol® process. 
1. The problem of contaminated sediments and the Novosol® process 
The natural environment is subject to many forms of industrial, urban and agricultural 
waste, which create a rich and diverse sediment contaminant. Solvay SA began 
development of Novosol® in partnership with the Université Libre de Bruxelles 
(Depelsenaire, 2006; Breugelmans, 2007) in 1993. It was initially developed to treat 
airborne ash resulting from incineration. From 1999, it was applied to the treatment of a 
wide range of contaminated sediments. 
Novosol® is divided into two stages (Novosol®, 2010): a stage of phosphatation, which 
aims to stabilize the heavy metals present in the sediment, followed by a stage of 
calcination, which destroys organic matter and provides reusable materials. 
This technology, which brings together many stakeholders, creates a high level of risk 
which must be controlled. Control is achieved through the application of a risk analysis 
technique known as STPA. STPA is based on the STAMP systemic accident model 
which advocates that the socio-technical system be considered in its entirety (Hardy, 
2010). 
2. The STAMP model and the STPA technique 
The STAMP accident model is based on systems control theory. The model was 
developed by Leveson (2003). In the STAMP model, safety is considered as a problem 
of control. 
2.1 The STAMP model 
The STAMP model comprises three interlinked concepts (safety constraints, 
hierarchical control structures and process models) described below: 
• Safety constraints: in contrast to the “classical” view of accidents (that they are due 
to a series of events), STAMP views accidents as the application of inadequate 
constraints within the socio-technical system. Safety constraints focus on the 
relations and decision-making processes that support non-hazardous system states.  
• Hierarchical security control structures: in order to prevent, or to analyse accidents, 
it is necessary to design a hierarchical control structure which represents the socio-
technical system in a given context. It must also be capable of representing the 
constraints described above, both during the development phase, and when the 
system is fully operational. 
• Process models and control loops: a control process (comprising both process 
models and control loops) operates between each level of the control hierarchy 
described above. The purpose of the control process is to translate a component, at 
one level, into a control at another level, either upwards or downwards through the 
hierarchy. It is represented schematically as a control loop describing the control 
process. 
2.2 The STPA threat analysis technique 
STPA is based on the three concepts just described, and can be used for safety 
assessments or accident analysis. It is implemented in three main phases described 
below: 
• Phase 1: defines the safety requirements of the system. It is divided into two sub-
phases. The first sub-phase defines requirements in terms of safety. The second 
establishes the safety control structure, which defines the roles and responsibilities 
of system components, and aims to identify all interactions between them. 
• Phase 2: integrates the safety requirements of the system, in the form of safety 
constraints, at each hierarchical level in the structure.  
• Phase 3: process models (control loops) are formalised. This is in order to identify 
any weak controls which may lead to the violation of a security constraint, and 
consequently a state in which an accident can occur. The controls and constraints 
defined in Phase 2 are potentially subject to violations arising from the process 
models and control loops inherent at each level of the structure. Consequently, the 
objective of this third phase is to determine at which level of the process model, 
and where in the control loop, there are weaknesses which may cause the violation 
of a constraint. Constraint violations can make the system shift towards a state 
where an accident may happen. 
3. Application of the STPA technique to Novosol® 
Each of the stages of the STPA methodology are now reviewed and applied to 
Novosol® (Hardy, 2010): 
- Phase 3.1: definition of system requirements with respect to safety and control 
structures 
 
Figure 1: An analysis of Novosol® using the STPA technique. The structure takes into 
account the development and operation of Novosol®, and shows the interactions 
between hierarchical levels (Hardy, 2010). 
Using the STPA method, the requirements and the “system” constraints of Novosol® 
are defined in the first sub-phase. Table 1 shows the requirements and constraints for 
businesses currently using Novosol® (comprising Solvay SA during development, and 
currently SEDISOL and SIFA). 
Table 1: Examples of requirements definition and constraints for businesses operating 
Novosol® 
Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA) 
Safety requirements and constraints 
Treatment of sediments contaminated by organic compounds and heavy metals 
Responsible for the smooth conduct of inspections and preparation of reports on the use 
and development of Novosol® in consultation with national and international bodies 
Responsible for defining requirements and the operational performance of Novosol® 
with respect to national and international regulations  
The cornerstone of this sub-phase is to define and to establish the control structure for 
system safety, as described by Leveson ( 2004). Using the definition of requirements 
and constraints from the first sub-phase, a hierarchical control structure can be created 
(Figure 1) which includes a definition of the roles and responsibilities of each 
component – in terms of both control and feedback. 
The analysis provides an overview of the system, and highlights interactions between 
the hierarchical levels. Using this structure, roles and responsibilities are integrated, and 
it becomes easier to determine the influence components have on each other. 
Establishing roles and responsibilities supports the following phase: the definition and 
integration of constraints, at the level of each structural component. 
- Phase 3.2: integration of system requirements at each level of the hierarchy, in the 
form of safety constraints 
This second phase depends on the first. It aims to integrate requirements and safety 
constraints, with respect to the various interactions between components, at each 
hierarchical level. Requirements are defined, and then applied (in the form of safety 
constraints) to the interactions between components of the safety control structure 
(identified in Phase 1). Constraints must be analysed in detail. It is at this point that 
inadequate constraints, which could play a role in creating an accident, are identified. 
The result of this analysis translates into the definition of inadequate, or (in the 
framework of a security assessment) potential control measures. Inadequate controls are 
identified at each hierarchical level, which correspond to the interactions identified 
when the control structure was prepared (Table 2). 
Table 2: Inadequate control mechanisms for businesses using Novosol® 
Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA) 
Potential or inadequate control measures 
The operating company does not meet operational requirements for the safe use of 
Novosol® 
The operating company is not able to meet the requirements of the company 
responsible for the development of Novosol® 
The operating company does not provide inspection reports to overseeing agencies  
Inadequate control mechanisms are translated into constraints and safety requirements 
then integrated at the level of the system component (Table 3).  
Table 3: Inadequate control mechanisms for businesses using Novosol® 
Business using Novosol® (SEDISOL or SIFA) 
(Potential) constraints 
The operating company must be able to meet safe operating requirements 
The operating company must be able to meet the developmental requirements of 
Novosol® 
The operating company must provide inspection reports to overseeing agencies 
- Phase 3.3: Analysis of the process models (control loops (Figure 2)) to identify 
weaknesses in control that could lead to the violation of a safety constraint and 
therefore a state where an accident could occur. 
 
Figure 2: Defects in the control loop. Finding weaknesses in a control loop enables 
inadequate control actions to be identified. 
The constraints defined in Phase 2 can be violated, and shift the system towards a 
dangerous state where an accident may occur. The objective in Phase 3 is to determine 
where in the control loop (or loops) a weakness (or weaknesses) may surface, as it is 
these weaknesses which lead to inadequate controls and change the state of the system. 
As an example, Figure 3 describes the “maintenance and evolution” control loop of the 
system. 
 
Figure 3: The “maintenance and evolution” control loop of Novosol®. This loop 
integrates the various components which interact with the process model at a particular 
level. It highlights interactions at various hierarchical levels.  
4. Conclusion 
The STPA technique, based on the STAMP model, allows us to consider a system 
throughout its life-cycle, taking into account all possible interactions. It focuses not on a 
chain of events, but on the problem of control between different hierarchical levels of 
the system. The clear advantage of its application to Novosol® is that it is possible to 
establish an overall view of the system, and not simply to focus on the technical 
process. This generates an optimisation of both the treatment process, and the safety and 
performance of the system as a whole.  
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